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Multinational Firms and the Development of
the Iranian Oil Industry*
KARIM PAKRAVAN**
Between late 1973 and early 1974, the foreign oil industry was
subjected to revolutionary economic changes. Crude oil pricing
decisions, traditionally initiated by the international oil companies, were taken over by the OPEC' members. . . . The OPEC
2
members quadrupled the price of crude oil, and the OAPEC
members cut back production and put an embargo on shipments
to the United States for political purposes. These actions set in
motion radical changes in national energy policies, in international balance of payments, and in the role of multinational oil
companies. The age of inexpensive oil and of market determination of petroleum prices and outputs had passed.'

The effects of the revolutionary decisions initiated by the
oil producing countries in the early 1970's upon the OPEC
members themselves were scarcely less profound than those
felt by the oil consuming world. The hitherto exploited producing countries suddenly found in their hands not only a potentially destructive weapon in terms of joint pricing and producing decisions, but also opportunities to restructure their relationships with the multinational oil firms. 4 Iran took advantage
of this opportunity, replacing the Iranian Consortium Agreement' with a long term supply contract that brought all oil
operations in Iran under the direct control of the Iranian government through its agent, the NIOC. This agreement, in con* Editor's note: The reader will note that this article was written prior to the
occurrence of the events which have recently transpired in Iran.
** Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Free University of Iran.
M.S., 1972, London School of Economics; Ph.D., Econ., 1976, University of Chicago.
1. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
2. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.
3. N. JACOBY, MULTINATIONAL OIL 301 (1974).
4. A multinational firm is one owning producing assets in at least two countries,
and, in the case of the "Majors" (British Petroleum, Exxon, Shell, Gulf, Texaco,
Mobil, Socal), many more than two countries.
5. Under the terms of the consortium agreement, the seven "Majors" participated
in predetermined percentages: British Petroleum (40%), Royal Dutch Shell (14%), the
five U. S. Majors (7% each), eleven independent oil companies, known as IRICON
(5%), and the Companies Franqaises des Ptroles (CFP) (6%) in exploration and production of all petroleum within the consortium area (100,000 square kilometers). The
Iranian royalty was fixed at 12.5% of total revenue, and in addition, shared equally in
net profits. The effect of the consortium in financial terms was enormous: an immediate tripling of Iran's per barrel revenue (from twenty-five to eighty cents per barrel).
6. National Iranian Oil Company. Under the supply contracts presently in effect,
the NIOC sells petroleum to the consortium at a posted price per barrel, usually
including a minor discount to the multinationals with whom Iran formerly dealt on a
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junction with the joint venture contract,7 (used primarily with
independent oil companies), and the newer service contracts,'
gives Iran unprecedented control over the production and sale
of its oil? However, Iran, just as all OPEC members, does not
concession basis. The discount is partly used by the consortium to make loans to NIOC
to cover its capital outlays. NIOC is presently renegotiating this purchase agreement
because of its dissatisfaction with the consortium's performance, especially concerning
the "minimum offtake program," whereby the consortium agreed to purchase a minimum amount every year.
7. Under the typical joint venture contract, the government acts in its sovereign
capacity and as a partner in the venture. The joint venture pays taxes to the sovereign
based upon a predetermined percentage of revenue (usually 50%). The government
then, as a partner, again takes some 50% of the remaining profit with a result that the
percentage of profit is 75%-25% in favor of the producing country.
8. The service contract is coming into increasing use throughout the world, but
as yet there is no information available on the net benefits accruing under it to the
host government. Under a service contract, the producing country bears the economic
risk of discovery and owns all production assets. The multinational firm supplies the
technical and managerial expertise of discovery, refining, and marketing for a fee,
usually a percentage of the profit.
9. In a comparative analysis (using these variables: financial return to producing
countries, national sovereignty, and conservation), it seems from available data that
the joint venture regime is more favorable to the producing country than the concession
regime, which was so widely used in the period from 1954-1973, principally in the
consortium agreement.
While, as the following table suggests, the concession regime is slightly more
favorable in terms of financial return,
Table 1
Per barrel disposable Revenue Received
by Iran (cents per barrel)
Producer
Consortium
SIRIP
IPAC
IMINICO
LAPCO
NIOC

1968
80
22
40
18
140

1969
83
22
33
24
29
200

1970
123
22
29
31
52
174

1971
133
25
51
39
89
182

1972
164
28
75
66
100
200

1973
860-960
24
88
106
144
348

1974
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1336

the difference decreases as the price of oil increases. F. FESHARAKI, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY (1976).
However, in terms of conservation, the joint venture regime appears clearly superior. Conservation may be defined as lower production and/or investment in order to
maintain or increase capacity. Two indices that are useful in presenting the relative
conservation efforts of the two regimes are the cumulative drilling-production ratio
(CDPR) and the ultimate reserves-cumulative production ratio (URCPR). Generally,
a higher CDPR will mean a greater effort in maintaining or increasing capacity, while
a lower URCPR will mean a greater effort in conserving the resource through lower
production. Although these indices have not been adjusted for any qualitative differences in the oil bearing fields, considering the fact that every oil region included
belongs to the same oil basin, these indices do retain explanatory power.
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yet possess the technical knowledge necessary to properly conduct all phases of oil production, from upstream to downstream
activities.10 The multinationals, on the other hand, possess a
Table 2
Cumulative Drilling-Production
Ratio
(Meter/thousand cu. m)

Consortium*
SIRIP
IPAC

1960-73

1973-76

.57
9.7
3.32

.92
2.08
3.24

Computed on the basis of NIOC annual reports 1960-76.
*OSCO after 1973.
This table indicates a better performance for the two joint ventures considered
than for the consortium, even bearing in mind the superior quality of the consortium
oil fields.
Table 3
Cumulative Production-Reserves Ratio

Consortium
IPAC
SIRIP
LAPCO

Cumulative
Production
(million)
bbls

Ultimate
Proven
Reserves
(million)
bbls

28084
299
126
484

80850
2457
2113
1500

Cumulative
Production
Ultimate
Reserves
Ratio
.34
.12
.60
.32

Based on a field compilation. Data reported in 1976.
The figure for LAPCO is lowered by the fact that it does not include ultimate reserves for Bahrain field, for which no data is available.
Table three indicates a better performance for IPAC and SIRIP than the consortium and LAPCO in terms of a slower depletion of oil reserves.
Conservation is here considered of primary importance because effective resource
management is essential to increase the life of the exhaustible oil supply, and thereby
increase the transition phase from a world economy based on exhaustible fossil fuels
to one based upon an inexhaustible source of energy, such as solar or geothermal
energy. Such a lengthened transition phase is essential to help prevent the disastrous
effects on the world economy that can be expected if the fossil fuels are too rapidly
depleted.
10. Upstream activities consist of exploratory and development activities, such as
geological and geophysical search activities, drilling of exploratory and development
wells, and arranging the technical infrastructure. Midstream activities include the
transportation of oil by pipeline and/or tanker ships. Downstream activities consist of
refining and marketing.
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virtual monopoly over this technical and managerial knowhow. As such technology cannot practically be developed over
the short run, Iran will continue to be dependent upon the
multinationals to properly exploit its oil reserves. This necessitates a discussion of the proper role for the multinational oil
firm in Iran on terms that will maximize the benefits to the
producing country. In this connection, the following fields may
be identified in which foreign operator assistance will continue
to be necessary over the short run: provision of technology in
upstream, midstream, and downstream operations, and the
provision of capital. In what follows, each will be analyzed in
turn.
I. PROVISION OF TECHNOLOGY
Given that foreign oil firms (and this includes independent
as well as multinational oil firms) have a virtual monopoly on
the technology of upstream, midstream, and downstream operations, as well as the fact that the development of such technology is a long and costly process, the solution for Iran would
seem to include the purchase of technical services from foreign
firms while simultaneously developing its own technology. The
development of technology does not mean the importing or
even building of, for example, drilling platforms, but furthering
research and development that can expand on the existing
Iranian technological base. Engaging in this course of action
would require the creation of a general policy of fostering research and development through various incentives, especially
incentives for private industry. This program in the long run
will decrease reliance on foreign operators at all stages of the
extraction process. This, in turn, will allow Iran to maximize
the benefits from the exploitation of Iranian oil."' However, in
the short run, the multinational oil firm will continue to play
a large role in the various processes of developing the Iranian
oil reserves. This role can be better understood by examining
each step in the development process.
A. Upstream Operations
In the initial stage of geological and geothermal explora11. See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/5344 (1962). This resolution recognized that
complete and permanent sovereignity over all natural resources rests with the people
of the state in which such resources lie. This of course recognizes Iran's right to exploit
its vast petroleum reserves for its own benefit.
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tion, the crucial factor is the availability of trained personnel.
The NIOC can therefore immediately take over all such activities, and simply procure the necessary human expertise.
The next step in the exploratory process is the drilling of
exploratory and development wells. This does require sophisticated technology unavailable on a large scale. The international drilling industry is highly competitive and, therefore,
quite cost efficient. This invites, on at least a short and medium run basis, the purchase from the foreign operators of such
services until the Iranian domestic drilling industry reaches a
level of technological sophistication that will allow it to compete with foreign operations.
B. Midstream Operations
In the transportation of oil in pipelines, the construction
12. There is also significant evidence that prior to the drastic OPEC pricing decisions of 1973, the oil industry as a whole had begun to enter an era of freer competition.
(See, e.g., N. JACOsY, MULTINATIONAL OIL 299 (1974), for a view that crude oil prices
had become essentially market-determined rather than supplier-announced, in the
major consuming nations in the period from 1957-1973.) This can be seen from a
presentation of the changes in the concentration of the foreign oil in industry in the
period for 1953 to 1972:
Table 4
Summary of Changes in Concentration of the Foreign Oil Industry
By Division, 1953 and 1972
1953

Division
of the
Industry
Area of Operation
Proven Reserves
Production
Refining Capacity
Tanker Capacity
Product Marketing

1972

"Seven
Largest"
Companies
Combined
(Percent)

All Other
Companies
Combined
(Percent)

64
92
78
73
29
72

36
8
13
27
71
28

"Seven
Largest"
Companies
Combined
(Percent)
24
67
71
49
19
54

All Other
Companies
Combined
(Percent)
76
33
29
51
81
46

Id.
However, the tendency of the foreign suppliers to control supply through a mechanism known as the Aggregated Programmed Quantity Agreement between the members of the Iran Consortium (that is, the seven Majors), as well as the tight control of
marketing outlets by the majors may make such competition more illusory than real.

340

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND POLICY

VOL. 8:335

of the pipeline can be taken over in the long run by the domestic industry. However, until it becomes large enough to undertake such enormous projects, such construction projects will
have to be contracted out to foreign construction firms. The
actual naval transfer of petroleum is entirely another matter.
The oil tanker business is becoming increasingly risky. Large
fluctuations in tanker rates in the past year have been very
burdensome both to shipbuilders and tanker fleet owners.
There is, of course, the further risk of pollution of the marine
environment by tankers. Given the strong competition in the
international oil tanker business, as well as the enormous capital expenditures necessary to build a fleet, a more prudent
policy would be to simply purchase necessary tanker services.
C. Downstream Operations
These operations, consisting of refining and marketing,
require the greatest amounts of technical, financial, and managerial expertise. It is this facet of the oil development process
that seems to be the most dependent upon foreign oil operatives. This supplies the foreign multinational oil firm offering
such expertise a powerful lever in negotiating with producing
countries. In this area, then, special emphasis in developing a
domestic industry would seem to offer great benefits to Iran.
This must be viewed in terms of development in the long run,
as the tremendous financial and intellectual efforts required
preclude short term development. Viable alternatives in the
refining industry would seem to be (in additon to a gradual
development of Iranian refineries), the purchase, in joint venture contracts, of refining services abroad, or simply to allow
the crude oil to be refined abroad by the foreign multinationals,
as is presently the case.
Marketing presents a more formidable challenge. Although by 1977, NIOC was exporting (marketing) directly
1,165 TBD,'3 this was mostly to Eastern Bloc and Third World
Countries.14 However, the traditional control of marketing and
distribution by the Majors in the Western consuming countries
has thus far prevented the development of large scale market13. Thousand barrels daily.
14. For instance, NIOC recently entered into joint ventures for refineries in both
India and South Africa, as well as concluding barter deals with Brazil (oil for industrial
and agricultural goods involving approximately one billion U.S. dollars) and various
Comecon countries.
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ing activities in such countries. It would appear to be a very
risky and costly undertaking to attempt to preempt a share of
this potentially vast market for Iranian oil. This is true not only
due to the risks inherent in such an enterprise, but also because
of the vast distribution structure that would have to be set up
and staffed. While certainly possible and promising in the long
run, in the immediate future, the multinational oil firm will
continue to play the key role in the refining and marketing of
crude oil.

II.

PROVISION OF CAPITAL

The oil industry is capital intensive. This is true not only
because of the tremendous amount of assets necessary to conduct even the most modest of operations, but also because the
oil industry is entering an irreversibly increasing cost phase.'"
While Iranian oil revenues are high,'8 they are largely earmarked for domestic economic development. Thus, most of the
required capital for further resource development must be provided by the international petroleum industry. The incentives
necessary to attract the vast amounts of capital required can
be included in the joint venture and long term supply contracts.
III. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the revolutionary economic changes
wrought by the OPEC cartel action of 1973, oil producing countries as a whole are beginning to redefine their relationships
15. This is caused by the increasing difficulty of locating and extracting a scarce
resource in an industry where the lowest cost oil fields (such as the one exploited by
the Iran Consortium) are all but gone. The search for oil thus must lead to more
offshore drilling and similar costly operations. Of course, world inflation also serves to
increase cost. The following table graphically demonstrates the rapidly increasing
investment per daily barrel, which is an index of the average cost of investment in
capacity for the period 1972-1976.
Table 5
Investment per daily barrel
US $/daily barrel
World
Middle East

1973
275
40

1974
415
46

1975
447
52

1976
548
94

16. Oil revenues for the OPEC countries in 1974 as a result of the pricing decisions
were an additional $60 billion due the OPEC countries from the consuming nations,
N. JACOBY, supra note 12, at 302 (1974).
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with the multinational oil firms, who formerly controlled not
only production, but pricing decisions as well. However, despite the new found control of production and pricing by oil
producing countries, the very nature of the industry, (one requiring very sophisticated technical, financial, and managerial
expertise) mandates a continued active role in the Middle East
industry by the multinational oil firms possessing the necessary expertise.
Iran, over the long run, must work to maximize the benefits derivable from its vast oil reserves by developing its own
technology, especially in the areas of upstream research and
discovery and downstream marketing. This will require a vast
national effort concentrating on expanding and enriching the
existing Iranian base to include the necessary technical, managerial, and investment know-how needed to make Iran a full
participant in the Middle East oil industry.

